Abstract. In this paper, we consider estimation of nonlinear panel data models that include individual specific fixed effects. Estimation of these models is complicated by the incidental parameters problem; that is, noise in the estimation of the fixed effects when the time dimension is short generally results in inconsistent estimates of the common parameters due to the nonlinearity of the problem. We present a penalty for the objective function that reduces the bias in the resulting point estimates. The penalty function involves only cross-products of scores and the hessian matrix and so is simple to construct in practice and requires no modification for models with multiple individual specific parameters. We present simulation results that suggest that the penalized optimization approach may substantially reduce the bias in nonlinear fixed effects models. We illustrate our approach in an empirical study of insider trading activity, where we estimate a dynamic ordered probit model with multiple firm specific effects.
Introduction
One of the most appealing features of panel data is the flexibility that it gives researchers in allowing them to model time-invariant individual specific effects. In the linear model, the most common approach to dealing with individual specific heterogeneity in economics is to allow for individual specific intercepts that are treated as parameters to be estimated. This approach is appealing as it allows the researcher to estimate the common slope parameters of the model without needing to specify a mixture distribution for the individual specific effects.
However, as first noted by Neyman and Scott (1948) , leaving the individual heterogeneity unrestricted in a nonlinear or dynamic model generally results in inconsistent estimators of the common parameters due to the incidental parameters problem; that is, noise in the estimation of the fixed effects when the time dimension is short results in inconsistent estimates of the common parameters due to the nonlinearity of the problem.
A number of approaches to removing the incidental parameters bias from estimates of the common model parameters have been developed. In some special cases, estimators of the common parameters that are consistent with the number of observations per individual fixed are available; see, for example, Arellano and Honoré (2001) and Chamberlain (1984) for reviews and Anderson (1970) , Chamberlain (1985) , Honoré (1992) , Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000a, 2000b) , Horowitz and Lee (2004) , and Manski (1987) for some specific cases. Unfortunately, such estimators generally only apply to specific models and the existence of such estimators seems to be quite rare. In addition, the consistency of these estimators typically comes from finding clever ways to avoid estimating the fixed effects, so they generally do not provide any guidance to estimating average marginal effects of covariates, which may be the quantities of interest in many cases.
Recently, a number of additional approaches have been proposed that use asymptotic approximations derived as both the number of individuals, n, and the number of observations per individual, T , go to infinity jointly; see, for example, Arellano and Hahn (2005) for an excellent survey and Alvarez and Arellano (2003) , Arellano (2003) , Carro (2006) , Fernández-Val (2004 , Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) , Newey (2004), and Woutersen (2005) for specific approaches. These estimators are designed to remove the O(1/T ) bias from the fixed effects estimators of the common model parameters. In cases where T is moderate, these corrections may offer substantial improvements relative to uncorrected fixed effects estimates, and they are likely to perform better than uncorrected fixed effects even when T is small though substantial bias may remain. The approaches pursued in these papers are appealing in that they are generally applicable. In addition, estimation of the fixed effects is explicitly considered and so bias reductions for effects averaged over the individual effects may also be pursued in a straightforward manner.
In this paper, we present an approach to bias reduction for fixed effects panel models that falls within the second category. Specifically, we consider estimation using a penalized objective function where the penalty function is designed to remove the O(1/T ) bias of the resulting estimator. The penalty function is constructed using the Hessian and scores from the unpenalized objective function which are typically necessary for performing asymptotic inference. Hence, forming the penalty does requires only calculation of quantities that are readily available to the researcher. The form of the penalty function is also quite intuitive; for example, when the objective function is a likelihood, the objective function is penalized for finite sample deviations from the information equality.
The basic approach that we consider is valid for both static and dynamic models and allows for multiple individual specific parameters. We also provide results that can be used to bias-correct the marginal impact of a regressor on a functional of interest averaged over the individual specific parameters. Such average effects provide a useful summary of an effect over the population and in many cases are more meaningful than the individual parameters of the model.
We consider the finite sample performance of the procedure through a series of simulation studies. We find that the proposed bias reduction is useful for improving point estimates and inference about parameters. In the simulations, we also see that the bias reduction does not substantially increase the variance of the estimator relative to the uncorrected estimates but does remove a large portion of the bias. Thus, the bias-corrected estimators tend to perform substantially better than the uncorrected estimators in terms of mean-squared error. We also find that our penalty function approach performs comparably to other bias corrected estimators considered in the literature.
We illustrate our approach in an empirical study of insider trading activity. We estimate a dynamic ordered probit model where the outcome, y it ∈ {−1, 0, 1} denotes respectively, selling, no activity, or buying of the firm's equity shares by corporate officers and directors of a given firm, i, in a given quarter. We include multiple firm-specific parameters in this model to allow unobserved firm-specific factors, such as litigation risk, the structure of executive compensation, and concerns about regulatory attention, to affect insiders' decision to buy or sell in different ways. Bias correction is potentially very useful in this setting as the model is nonlinear and is estimated using a relatively short sample period. Our penalty function approach is attractive here because it allows for multiple individual specific parameters in a simple fashion. We find that our bias correction has an impact on estimates of several coefficients and marginal effects that is both substantial relative to standard errors and relevant in the economic interpretation of the results. After bias-correction, we find modest evidence that insiders use information in future returns when making trading decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the penalty function and provide key properties of the resulting estimators. Section 3 illustrates the penalty function in a number of examples. We present simulation results in Section 4 and our insider trading application in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
A Penalty Function for Nonlinear Fixed Effects Models
In this section, we characterize our proposed penalty function and illustrate how it removes the O(1/T ) bias from the estimates of the parameters of nonlinear fixed effects models. As with other recent papers regarding bias reduction for fixed effects panel models such as those cited above, our formal results make use of an asymptotic sequence in which n and T go to infinity at the same rate. Under these asymptotics, we find that the estimator resulting from the penalized optimization problem is asymptotically normal and correctly centered.
2.1. The Incidental Parameters Problem. Suppose that we are interested in estimating a panel data model defined by an objective function
with a common parameter of interest θ 0 and individual specific parameters α i0 , i = 1, ..., n, where ϕ(·) does not depend on T . The extremum estimator of θ 0 and the α i0 may then be defined as ( θ, α 1 , ..., α n ) = arg max θ,α 1 ,...,αn Q(θ, α 1 , ..., α n ).
We assume that the problem is posed such that in time series asymptotics where T → ∞ with n fixed ( θ, α 1 , ..., α n ) p → (θ 0 , α 10 , ..., α n0 ).
The incidental parameters problem arises when n is large and T is small due to the estimation error in the α i . Intuitively, the bias can be seen by considering the optimization problem where the α i are first concentrated out of the problem. In other words, suppose we find θ by first solving
and then θ = arg max
It follows from standard results for extremum estimators (e.g. Amemiya (1985) Chapter 4) that
. In other words, the randomness in the α i when T is small results in an estimator, θ, that is the solution to a "misspecified" problem: Even as N → ∞, the optimization problem one solves for θ using the estimated α i (θ) differs from the one that would be solved if the individual specific coefficients α i were known.
While θ T usually differs from θ 0 , it will generally be true that θ T → θ 0 as T → ∞. In addition, for smooth functions ϕ(·), we will have
2 ) where B/T is the O(1/T ) bias of the estimator. Under standard regularity conditions, it will also generally be true that
θ ) for I θ and Ω defined below; see, for example, White (1982) . Using these results, we can then see that even when n and T grow at the same rate such that n/T → ρ
That is, the uncorrected extremum estimator of θ 0 is incorrectly centered asymptotically even in cases where n and T increase at the same rate. Hahn and Newey (2004) , in static models, and Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) , in dynamic models, provide additional discussion of the incidental parameters problem using asymptotic expansions and also formally justify equation (2).
2.2. Bias in the Scores. In the preceding section, we intuitively presented the incidental parameters problem. For uncorrected extremum estimators, the estimation of the individual specific effects results in asymptotically incorrect inference even when T grows as fast as n due to the bias in the limiting distribution. Here we present further intuition for the incidental parameters bias by presenting a hueristic derivation of the bias in the scores of the optimization problem solved to estimate θ.
Before proceeding, it will be useful to define some notation. Let
The first term is the usual score evaluated at the truth and will have a zero expectation and, appropriately normalized, follow a central limit theorem. For the second and third terms, we can plug in the expression for α i (θ 0 ) − α i given in (4) to obtain
, from which we obtain
where b is the O(1/T ) bias in the score for θ. It follows that the bias in θ, defined in (2), is given by
Given the bias formulae informally derived above, there are a number of approaches one could pursue to produce biased reduced estimators of θ. Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) and Hahn and Newey (2004) consider estimating the bias of θ − θ given by I −1 θ b plugging in estimates θ and α i and then subtracting the estimated bias from θ to obtain a bias-reduced estimator θ = θ − I −1 θ b/T . Essentially this is just forming b by replacing the expectations on the right hand side of (6) with their sample analogues. It follows that the O(1/T ) bias in the estimator θ has been removed, and Hahn and Newey (2004) and Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) prove that θ is asymptotically normal with a correctly centered asymptotic distribution in asymptotics where n and T go to infinity jointly and n T → ρ. Alternatively, one could remove the bias from the score directly by subtracting off an estimate of b/T and then solving the corrected estimating equation; i.e. construct a bias reduced estimator θ that satisfies
This approach is explicitly considered in Hahn and Newey (2004) .
2.3. Bias Reduction via Penalized Optimization. As illustrated above, bias reduction for estimates of the common parameter, θ, may be performed by first computing the ML estimate, θ, then using the information in the sample to form an estimate of the bias.
In this section, we present an alternative approach to bias correction based on penalizing the objective function. There are several advantages to this approach. First, the penalty function we employ makes use of only the score and the hessian of the original problem, both of which are often used in performing inference and so are typically readily available to the researcher. The approach applies simply to problems with individual specific effects, and working directly with the objective function may offer computational advantages relative to the score correction in some cases.
Define the penalized objective function as
is the penalty function, and let
The first order condition for θ is given by 0 = U π ( θ) where
∂ ∂θ π i (x it , θ, α i (θ)). Then following the same informal argument from above, we can expand this score to obtain
. From this expression, we can see that any π i that satisfy
will remove the O 1 T bias from the scores for α i and θ. It is interesting to note that the right-hand side of (8) corresponds to the O(1/T ) bias in the scores for α i . In other words, a penalty function that satisfies (8) and (9) works by first removing the O(1/T ) bias from the estimator of α i and then removing the remaining bias from the estimator of θ. Note that this differs from the score correction mentioned in the previous section which corrects the score for θ of the concentrated problem but offers no correction for the α i .
We consider two ways to construct a penalty function. One approach is to compute the expectations on the right hand side of (8) and (9) analytically and then solve the implied set of differential equations for π i . We show below that this approach may perform extremely well in specific models. For the Neyman and Scott (1948) example and the linear dynamic panel data model, pursuing this approach produces √ n−consistent estimates of the common parameters. Unfortunately, explicit expressions for the expectations are typically not available except in tightly parameterized likelihood models. Even when the right hand sides of (8) and (9) can be computed analytically, the resulting differential equations will usually not have closed form solutions. For general nonlinear models, we could solve these differential equations using numerical methods at the cost of increased computational burden.
Instead, we propose a simple penalty function that satisfies conditions (8) and (9) quite generally. In particular, we consider a penalty defined by
where dim(α i ) = k and I α i and V α i are given by
and
It is straightforward to verify that (10) satisfies (8) and (9) by differentiating (10) with respect to θ and α i and taking limits as T → ∞.
The form of the penalty given in (10) is also quite intuitive, especially for likelihood models.
When evaluated at θ 0 and α i0 , I α i is simply the sample information matrix for α i , and V α i is a conventional HAC estimator of Var It is worth noting that using the HAC form for V α i is important for good performance for reducing bias in dynamic models even in cases where the scores would be uncorrelated if one had the true parameter values. The intuition for this is that even in cases where the scores are uncorrelated at the true parameter values, when evaluated at points away from the true parameter values, there will be correlation in the scores. Due to the potential for substantial finite sample bias, this will remain true even when the scores are evaluated at the estimated parameter values, and failing to account for this correlation may result in poor finite sample performance of the bias reductions.
We make two additional comments regarding the HAC estimator for V α i in the present context. First, while m = 1 is a natural bandwidth choice in short panels, one may wish to consider optimal bandwidth selection in longer panels and would certainly want to consider larger m in cases when more than one lag of the dependent variable is included. There are a number of approaches available for selecting bandwidths for estimating the spectral density at 0 and in principle these methods could be employed in the present context when longer panels are available. See, for example, the early work of Parzen (1957) as well as Newey and West ((1987) , (1994)), Andrews (1991) , and Andrews and Monahan (1992) who consider minimizing the approximate MSE of the estimator of the spectral density at 0 as a function of m for approaches that could readily be applied within each cross-sectional unit to generate an optimal bandwidth for each time series. One could also potentially employ cross-validation; see, for example, Velasco (2000) for recent work. We note that formally adapting these procedures and verifying their properties in the present context would require substantial work that is beyond the scope of the present paper. In addition, optimality for estimating the spectrum at zero does not imply optimality in terms of the properties of the bias-reduction.
As such, it seems that pursuing optimal bandwidth selection in the present context would be an interesting direction for future research. Second, our formulation makes use of the truncated kernel which may lead to an estimate of V α i which may not be positive definite.
We maintain this formulation for notational convenience but note that one could use a kernel that would guarantee positivity of the resulting estimator. While lack of positive definiteness has not been a problem in our simulation or empirical results, we note that it could arise especially as the time dimension increases and one worries more about bandwidth selection.
In addition, the automatic bandwidth selection procedures mentioned above generally rely on kernels that produce positive estimates of the spectrum at 0 which may also argue for the use of other kernels in some situations.
The penalty function may also be developed using the following intuition. As noted in Section 2.1, we may think of the incidental parameters problem as a form of misspecification resulting from the estimation error in the α i when T is small. Considering likelihood models with i.i.d. data for the moment, this misspecification should result in failure of the information equality for small T ; that is,
However, at the true parameter values
In other words, the information equality would be satisfied if we knew the α i ; but with small T , the estimation error in α i results in the failure of the information equality as with misspecified models, e.g. White (1982) . This difference suggests that a potential way to remove bias from the estimator would be to penalize the estimator for within sample deviations from the information inequality, which is exactly what the penalty defined in (10) does.
In likelihood models, as T gets large, − I
However, for small T , − I α i and V α i will generally differ, and π(·) penalizes the optimization problem for deviations from the information equality in finite samples.
In the preceding, we have heuristically presented stochastic expansions for α i and θ and argued that the use of the penalized objective function eliminates the O 1 T bias from the estimators. These arguments are formalized in the following result which states that the asymptotic distribution of the common parameter is correctly centered as n and T grow large at the same rate when the penalized objective function is used.
Theorem 1. As n → ∞ and T → ∞ such that n T → ρ and under regularity conditions given in Assumption 1 in the appendix, α i for i = 1, ..., n and θ are consistent and
where Ω = Var 1 √ T t U it , and U it and I θ are defined in (3).
Bias Correcting Fixed Effects Averages.
In the previous section, we demonstrated how solving the penalized optimization problem results in a bias reduction to estimates of the common parameters relative to estimators obtained from the unpenalized objective function. However, in many nonlinear models, one may be more interested in estimating effects averaged over the unobserved effects distribution than in the common parameters themselves. For example, in a panel discrete choice setting, one is likely more interested in estimating the effect of a covariate on the choice probabilities than in the index coefficients.
In this section, we illustrate bias reduction for these fixed effects averages.
Suppose we are interested in estimating
where w are values of the covariates. We consider estimation of µ by
For example, in a probit, one might be interested in the effect of a continuous variable on the probability that the dependent variable equals one:
where β j is the coefficient on the variable of interest and φ is the standard normal density function. We also note that the above formulation and the following results apply immediately to estimating an effect at a particular covariate value averaged over the unobserved effect distribution by simply replacing w and w it in the above expressions with the value of interest, say w * . The same basic ideas might also be applied fruitfully to bias-reduce other functionals of the estimated common parameters and unobserved effects, but we leave this extension to future work.
While both β and α i have the O(1/T ) bias removed, µ still needs additional correction due to the randomness in α i . Let σ 2 i be the variance of α i , then a bias-reduced estimate of µ is given by
for ψ it defined in (5). We note that the randomness in α i shows up as 1/T bias resulting from two sources: the variance of α i itself which is O(1/T ) and covariance between the score for α and the derivative of the functional of interest with respect to α. The HAC form in the covariance allows for possibly dependent data and may be simplified in the case of time-independent data. The expression may also be simplified when one is interested in the effect at a given value of w in which case the first term which is subtracted from µ is 0.
We note that the correction itself follows from a stochastic expansion of µ and its validity can be verified using arguments similar to those used for bias-reductions for the estimator of θ. Similar corrections for estimates of fixed effect averages are considered in Arellano and
Hahn (2005), Newey (2004), and Fernández-Val (2005) . Our correction differs by allowing for dependence. It is also slightly simpler because the penalty function cancels the first-order bias of α i as well as θ so this bias does not need to be accounted for in our correction.
2.5. Relation to Previous Work. The penalized optimization approach to bias reduction proposed above is closely related to a number of approaches to bias correction that have been proposed in the literature. Arellano and Hahn (2005) provide a more detailed and excellent review of the recent literature on bias reduction in panel data models. For static models, our penalized optimization approach produces similar estimating equations (scores) as the score corrections suggested by Hahn and Newey (2004) and Fernández-Val (2004) . These corrections build on the work of Firth (1993) , who considered score corrections to remove higher order bias from models with a fixed number of parameters. In the dynamic case, our approach produces scores similar to those that would be obtained using a slightly modified version of Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) .
1 Hahn and Newey (2004) show their score correction is asymptotically equivalent to the integrated likelihood estimator of Woutersen (2005) , though the score correction approach may be easier to implement as it does not require integration or an orthogonal parameterization. Woutersen (2005) also demonstrates that his integrated likelihood approach is asymptotically equivalent to the modified profile likelihood estimator of Cox and Reid (1987) . Carro (2006) and Arellano (2003) consider modification of the score (estimating equations)
for the concentrated likelihood (where individual specific parameters are concentrated out) in discrete choice panel models. In the more general statistical literature, Severini ((1998) , (2000)) and Sartori (2003) also consider adjustments to concentrated likelihoods to alleviate bias problems, and Severini (2002) has extended these approaches to other estimating equations contexts. In research contemporaneous to our own, Arellano and Hahn (2005) also propose similar corrections for concentrated likelihoods.
Our approach differs from the aforementioned score and criterion function corrections in working directly with the unconcentrated problem. It simultaneously corrects the O(1/T ) bias in both the common parameters θ and the α i . We also allow for multiple individual specific parameters in a simple fashion that appears to be novel relative to existing approaches.
Our penalized optimization approach may have computational advantages over score corrections in cases where the corrected scores have multiple zeros; this problem may also be overcome by using procedures that make corrections after optimization such as Hahn and Newey (2004) and Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) . Our procedure may also be implemented using only the score and hessian of the original optimization problem which are typically available to a researcher using modern global optimization routines which do not use gradient or hessian information, though one may wish to calculate scores and the hessian of the penalized problem as well if using gradient based optimization approaches.
Examples
We present four examples that highlight different aspects of our approach. We refer to the penalty function (10) as the HS penalty, as it involves the sample hessian and outer products of the scores. When a solution to (8)- (9) is available, we refer to it at as the IE penalty, as it involves integrating expectations of the scores and their derivatives. Our first two examples are linear models, the classic example considered by Neyman and Scott (1948) and a dynamic linear model. Our last two examples, the logit and probit, are nonlinear. In the probit example, the IE penalty requires numeric solution of a set of differential equations, but our penalization approach remains easy to implement using sample information.
3.1. Neyman-Scott. We begin with the classic example in which observations {y it } are normally distributed with individual-specific means, α i and common variance, σ 2 . This example is special because the probability limits of the three estimators we consider can be easily obtained analytically and compared. Ignoring constants for notational convenience, the log likelihood can be written
where y i is a T -vector and u i = y i − ι T α i . The maximum likelihood estimates are α i =ȳ i and
, so with T fixed, σ 2 ml is not consistent for σ 2 .
In this example the Fisher information for α i and the outer product of scores for α i are given by
and the corresponding penalized objective function is
In this case the penalty function leaves α i unchanged, while the estimate of σ 2 is multiplied
That is, the penalty function reduces the bias from order T −1 to order T −2 , as required by Theorem 1.
We can also construct a penalty function by computing expectations involving the scores explicitly and integrating. In this example, (8) implies
= 0; and after some algebra, 
The resulting estimator is then σ
This fixed-T consistency is a special property resulting from the structure of the likelihood in the linear model. In terms of the theory developed in Section 2, the two estimators σ 2 HS and σ 2 IE are equivalent in the sense that they are both free from O(1/T ) bias.
3.2. Dynamic Linear Model. Our second example generalizes the first by adding regressors, x i , and a lagged dependent variable. The likelihood has the same form (11) with
where L is the lag operator defined such that L j z i = (0 1×j , z i1 , . . . , z iT −j ) and L −j z i = (z ij , . . . , z iT , 0 1×j ) . Also note that we assume {x i , y i0 } is strictly exogenous and without loss of generality set y i0 = 0. The penalty function may be constructed as in Section 2.3 with
where we have used the HAC form of V because this is a dynamic model. The resulting estimator maximizes the objective function Q π HS = L− 
Note that while strict exogeneity of x i implies that ∂π IE i ∂β = 0, the expectation of the product of summed u i and lagged y i does depend on ρ. A solution to these differential equations is
This expression for π IE is equivalent to the correction proposed by Lancaster (2002) , who also shows that maximizing the objective function
n-consistent estimates of (ρ, σ 2 ) with T fixed.
3.3. Logit. In this example, the observations for each individual are y i , a T -vector containing zeros and ones, and a T × k array of regressors, x i . The likelihood has the form
where Λ i is a T -vector whose t th entry is Λ(x it β + α i ), and Λ(v) = e v 1+e v is the logistic cumulative distribution function. The penalty function π HS is easily constructed using
Note that if the model is dynamic (e.g., x i includes past values of y), the HAC form of V α i should be used.
The logit is a nonlinear example where (8) and (9) can be solved in closed form as in the linear examples. After some manipulation, these equations reduce to
,
is its derivative, and
• denotes element-by-element multiplication. In both cases the numerator is the derivative of the denominator, and solution π it is nonlinear, uses the same observables y i and x i , and has seen wide use in applied work.
Using Φ to denote the normal cdf, the likelihood has the same form (13) with Λ i replaced by Φ i , whose t th entry is Φ (x it β + α i ). The expressions for I α i and V α i , which are similar to the logit, are readily obtained by differentiating the log-likelihood and are omitted for brevity.
A key feature of the probit model is that, unlike for the logit, the differential equations (8) and (9) do not have solutions in closed form even in the static case.
The ordered probit model is a simple extension of the probit in which the natural parameterization includes multiple individual specific effects. We consider a dynamic version of this model, which we will use in our Monte Carlo study and empirical application below.
We suppose that the outcomes are given by y it ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and write the log likelihood for each observation as
where Φ it = Φ (µ it ) , Φ it = Φ (µ it + ν i ), and µ it = α i + ρ 1 1 {y it−1 =1} + ρ −1 1 {y it−1 =−1} + x it β.
In addition to α i , this model features a second individual specific parameter, ν i , which is assumed to be positive. Without this second effect, a change in unobserved heterogeneity would always affect the probabilities of the highest and lowest outcomes, P (y = 1) and P (y = −1), in opposite directions. This is an economically undesirable restriction in many applications. The HS form of the penalty function may readily be obtained by differentiating (14) . The form of the derivatives is somewhat cumbersome but quite standard, so the expressions are omitted for brevity. Note that as for the simple probit, the differential equations (8) and (9) are not soluble in closed form.
Monte Carlo Study
We present a brief Monte Carlo study that compares the finite sample properties of the maximum likelihood estimator and our bias corrected penalized likelihood estimators. We consider two example models. The first is the static logit, for which we can explicitly compute both forms of the penalty function discussed in Section 2 and compare the resulting penalized likelihood estimators with several alternative bias corrected estimators that have been proposed in the literature. The second model is an ordered probit with multiple individual specific effects, which we will consider in an empirical application in Section 5.
Since the model includes multiple individual specific effects, we consider only our corrections in this case. We refer to the penalty function (10), constructed using the sample hessian and outer product of scores, as the HS penalty. We refer to the solution of (8)-(9), when available, as the 'integrated expectations' or IE penalty. In addition to the estimators themselves, we also study the rejection frequencies of tests where the null hypothesis is that the estimated quantity equals its population value. Simulation designs are summarized in the Hahn and Newey (2004) , and the Conditional Logit estimator of Anderson (1970) , for panels of length T = 4, 8, and 12. Consistent with other studies, ML estimates of the index coefficient β display substantial bias in short-T panels. All of the bias corrected estimators perform substantially better than ML in estimating β, in many cases reducing RMSE by over 50% and greatly reducing size distortions for standard frequentist inference.
For each panel length we consider, the IE penalty and the conditional logit, which is known to be √ N -consistent with T fixed, perform similarly and are superior to the other estimators in terms of bias, root mean squared error (RMSE), and mean absolute error (MAE). The HS penalty also offers a substantial improvement over ML in estimating β, reducing bias by about 50% in the T = 4 case and 70% in the longer panels. In the T = 4 case, our HS penalty performs similarly in bias and RMSE terms to the Fernández-Val Results for the dynamic ordered probit model are reported in Table 2 for panels of length T = 8 and 20. To our knowledge, no explicit analytic bias correction has been proposed in the literature for this model, and the differential equations defining the IE penalty are not soluble in closed form. However, because the HS penalty depends only on the sample scores and hessian, it remains easily computed even in a dynamic model with multiple individual specific parameters. For both values of T , the bias in the ML estimator of β is similar in magnitude to the logit example. Estimates of the coefficients on the lagged outcome, ρ 1 and ρ −1 , are severely biased toward zero. In all cases, the HS penalty provides coefficient estimates that have smaller bias and RMSE than the ML estimates.
We also consider ML and bias corrected estimates of three marginal effects:
Bias corrected estimates of these effects are obtained using the approach in Section 2.4.
Although both estimates of µ x are approximately unbiased, the ML estimates of µ 1,1 and µ −1,−1 display bias toward zero that, relative to population values, is similar in magnitude to the estimates of the coefficients ρ 1 and ρ −1 . We make two observations regarding the T = 20 panel, which is the panel length we consider in the empirical application below. First, our bias correction removes roughly 50% of the bias in the estimates of lagged outcome effects relative to ML. In addition, the size distortions are modest when inference is based on bias corrected marginal effects. For µ x , the empirical rejection frequencies match with nominal levels up to Monte Carlo error. Mild size distortions remain for lagged outcome effects, but performance is dramatically better using bias corrected estimates: roughly a 15% rejection frequency at the nominal 5% level for µ 1,1 , compared to 67% when ML estimates are used.
The better inferential properties is one of several reasons why we focus on marginal effects when interpreting the results of our empirical application.
Insider Trading and Earnings Announcements
In this section, we apply our penalized likelihood estimator in an empirical study of insider trading activity. We study the extent to which corporate insiders trade on information about how future earnings surprises will affect the firm's share price, particularly shortterm information. Although there is substantial evidence in the literature (e.g., Meulbroek
(1992)) that insiders trade profitably on nonpublic information prior to takeovers, empirical evidence on the relationship between insider trading and earnings announcements is mixed, in part due to the difficulties in controlling for the changing regulatory environment and the heterogeneity in incentives faced by insiders at different firms. We attempt to provide some evidence on the relationship between insider trading and future returns around earnings announcements dealing with these issues by focusing on a narrow time window with a fairly constant regulatory environment and including firm specific effects to control for differences in incentives across firms. Our analysis complements related work by Roulstone (2006) which makes use of the same data, and we refer the reader there for a more thorough review of the literature on insider trading as well as further details on data sources and variable definitions.
Bias correction is potentially useful in this setting. We will estimate a dynamic nonlinear model with multiple firm specific effects using a panel of firms over a relatively short sample period, and therefore expect that bias will be a large component of estimator risk. In the remainder of this section, we outline the model, provide a brief discussion of the data and variable definitions, and finally present and discuss the results of ML and penalized likelihood estimation.
5.1. Model. The dependent variable is purchases or sales of equity shares by a firm's corporate insiders (top officers and directors), starting one day after the prior quarter's earnings announcement and ending one day before the current quarter's announcement. Previous studies in this literature have related the size of insiders' trades to measures of earnings surprises, which may be problematic for several reasons. First, the data is heavily censored, with 40% of the firm-quarters in our sample having no reported insider activity. Second, the optimal trade size may be a complicated function of insiders' information and other factors.
For example, a large volume of insider trading may be more likely to attract regulatory attention, particularly when followed by a large unanticipated earnings surprise. We therefore focus on the sign of net insider activity during a given quarter: y it = 1 denotes net buying by insiders of firm i in quarter t, y it = −1 denotes net selling, and y it = 0 denotes no net activity.
We estimate the following ordered probit model:
where CAR it , the cumulative abnormal return over the three days -1, 0, and 1 relative to the earnings announcement date, is the variable of chief interest; x it is a set of controls discussed below; δ t and δ c t are period specific effects; and α i and c i are time invariant firm specific effects. We note the inclusion of time effects violates the stationarity assumption under which we prove Theorem 1. We drop these effects in one specification below to demonstrate that the results are not sensitive to their inclusion.
The firm specific effects (α i , c i ) are present to allow insiders' decision to trade to depend on unobservable firm-specific factors including how executive compensation is structured, liquidity, and concerns about legal liability or regulatory attention. The inclusion of multiple effects allows these unobservable factors to affect buying and selling decisions differently. For example, concerns about legal liability may affect selling decisions more than buying decisions because insider selling ahead of bad news may be more likely to trigger lawsuits against the firm's management by investors. Similarly, we include two indicators, 1 {y it−1 = ±1} to allow the two types of insider activity (buying versus selling) to affect the probabilities of insider activity in future quarters in different ways.
In the most general specification we consider, the lower truncation point c it is allowed to depend on the same set of covariates as the the linear index y * where we note that c it > 0 is necessary for the model to be sensible. We therefore parameterize c it as an exponential-linear function of the right hand side variables. This is done to allow covariates to have asymmetric effects on the probabilities of buying versus selling. For example, if ρ
change in a right hand side variable that increases the probability of insider buying must also decrease the probability of insider selling. In our empirical analysis below, we find that several of our explanatory variables, including CAR, enter asymmetrically: Some affect the probability of trading in one direction but not the other, and a few affect the probability of buys and sells in the same direction. Below we refer to the specification where ρ Table 3 .
Insiders' decision to trade may be affected by a number of observable factors. As documented by Rozeff and Zaman (1998) , insider trading activity may depend on past returns and differ across value and growth stocks. Firm size is also potentially important as larger firms are more likely to employ stock-based compensation and the impact of earnings on share price can differ across large and small firms. We therefore include log(MVE), the natural log of the firm's market value of equity 10 days prior to the announcement, BM, the book to market ratio, and EAPRE6, the return on the firm's stock from six months to two days prior to the announcement minus the market return over the same period, as controls.
We include EAPOST6, the excess return on the firm's stock over the period two days to six months after the announcement, in order to control for non-earnings related future returns.
Models of informed trade, e.g. Kyle (1985) , predict that insider activity should respond to market volume, prompting us to include TURNOVER, the total trading volume during the quarter divided by shares outstanding.
Finally, the information content of earnings announcements may be influenced by institutional ownership and analyst coverage, prompting us to include INST, EEPS, and NUMEST, respectively the percentage of institutional ownership, the absolute value of announced earnings per share minus analysts' consensus forecast, and the number of forecasts in the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast released before the earnings announcement date. Because a sizable fraction of the firms in our sample have no analyst coverage, we also include a dummy variable dNUM0, which equals one if no consensus forecast was released.
Our analysis complements Roulstone (2006) effects and a Tobit model without firm effects and estimates both separately for buys and sells. In this application, the ordered probit specification allows us to combine information from both types of transactions while accomodating unobserved firm level heterogeneity in a very flexible way. We also include indicators for buying and selling in the previous quarter and allow each to have asymmetric effects on the probability of insider activity in the current period. Despite the shorter sample period and different model specification, our results are qualitatively very similar and the unanticipated earnings announcement return, CAR, remains statistically significant both before and after bias correction.
5.3. Results and Discussion. We present and discuss estimation results for several versions of the ordered probit model (15) using the data discussed above. We estimate all models considered by maximum likelihood. For models with individual specific effects, we also present penalized likelihood estimates using the penalty function given in equation (10) We first consider a standard ordered probit model, as given in (15) Table 4 present ML estimates and standard errors for this model, respectively without and with firm specific fixed effects.
Bias corrected estimates for the model with fixed effects are presented in the right columns of the table. These estimates highlight two important features of our data and estimation procedure. First, unobserved firm-level heterogeneity plays a prominent role. Controlling for firm specific heterogeneity has a large impact on the coefficients on the lagged outcomes, 1 {y it−1 = 1} and 1 {y it−1 = −1}. Book to market and analyst coverage are no longer statistically significant after fixed effects are added. Also, for the fixed effects specification, our bias correction has a substantial impact on several of the coefficient estimates. This is particularly true for the coefficients on lagged outcomes (as was noted in the Monte Carlo study above) but also for CAR, which is significant at the 5% level before bias correction but not afterward.
Coefficient estimates for the asymmetric ordered probit model are presented in Table 5 .
Estimates of the index coefficients, ρ · , β, and γ, appear in the top panel of the (15) with and without time period effects. Several right hand side variables have asymmetric effects on insider buying and selling, most notably the lagged outcomes, turnover, book to market, and market value. For selling in the previous quarter, the estimated coefficient ρ −1 is insignificant at the 5% level while ρ c −1 is highly significant and negative. Market volume displays perhaps the most pronounced assymetric effect. The coefficient on turnover is insignificant at the 5% level when symmetry is imposed (see Table 4 ) but is highly significant in both the upper and lower panels of Table 5 . Our bias correction again substantially impacts the coefficients on lagged outcomes, and behaves nearly identically when period specific effects are excluded. Regarding the variable of chief interest, CAR, we note that the bias correction substantially reduces the coefficient estimate though it does remain significant at the 5% level. This finding is economically interesting as it provides some evidence that insiders do base current trading decisions on future market reactions to future news releases.
As with any nonlinear model, directly interpreting the coefficient estimates can be difficult. This is particularly true here. For example, for a given right-hand side variable x (j) in (15), we know that if γ j > 0, an increase in the value of x (j) will increase the probability of buying by insiders in the given quarter. However, if in addition γ c j < 0 (as is the case with turnover and book to market), an increase in x (j) will raise the level of the index y * but also push the lower truncation point c it towards zero, leaving the net impact on the probability of insider selling ambiguous. We therefore report average marginal effects, E ∂ ∂x it P (y it = 1) and E ∂ ∂x it P (y it = −1) , and bias-correct our estimates of these effects as described in Section 2.4. When x (j) is an indicator, as with our lagged outcomes, we present the discrete analogue, E P (y it = ±1|x
Estimates of these effects for the asymmetric probit model with time period effects are presented for selected variables in Table 6 . Note for several right hand side variables, including turnover, market value, and both lagged outcomes, the bias corrected estimate of one or both partial effects differs from the ML estimate by at least one standard error.
Our estimates of average marginal effects are economically interesting for several reasons.
The earnings announcement return CAR has a statistically significant effect on the probability of insider buying (at the 5% level before bias correction and the 10% level afterward)
but not on selling. This seems to agree with several results in Roulstone (2006) , who suggests that the impact of earnings announcements on sales may be more difficult to estimate due to the presence of liquidity trades (e.g., selling by insiders for portfolio rebalancing purposes). This hypothesis may also be reflected in two other estimated partial effects. For market value, we find that insiders at larger firms (which are more likely to employ stockbased compensation) are less likely to be buyers and more likely to be sellers, with both effects statistically significant at the 1% level. We also find statistically significant effects for previous returns (EAPRE6 ), while future non-earnings announcement returns fail to be statistically significant. In particular, high previous returns decrease the probability of buying and increase the probability of selling, both of which could be explained by insiders' portfolio rebalancing.
Some of the effects of other covariates are also quite interesting. Of our control variables, turnover has the most pronounced asymmetric effect: larger market volume substantially increases the probability of both types of insider activity. This result is of interest, because while the Kyle (1985) model implies that informed agents should trade in larger quantities when market volume is higher, it does not necessarily specify how market volume impacts the decision to trade. The effects of activity in the previous quarter are also asymmetric.
With all other observables held fixed, insider selling in the previous quarter increases the probability of selling by insiders in the current quarter by 6.3% but does not significantly change the probability of buying. Similarly, insider buying last quarter raises the probability of buying in the current quarter by 6.9% and decreases the probability of selling by 1.2%.
Book to market is unique in that it has a statistically significant effect on the probability of selling but not on the probability of buying. Note that this conclusion is not obvious from inspection of the coefficient estimates in 5.
Overall, we find that future earnings announcement returns have a small but quite robust effect on insiders' decision to trade. Our results are qualitatively similar to Roulstone (2006) who uses the same data but over a much longer time period and with a very different specification. Our penalized likelihood estimator is simple to implement, and the bias correction has an impact on a number of coefficients and average partial effects that is large relative to standard errors.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a penalty function approach to estimation of structural parameters in panel data models with individual specific coefficients. Our penalty function is simple to compute, even for nonlinear dynamic models: it involves only the sample information matrix and outer products of scores, which are already widely used by practitioners for inference. We also consider an alternate construction of our penalty function as the solution to a set of differential equations involving expectations of products of the scores and their derivatives. Interestingly, in two linear example models, this alternate construction of the penalty function results in √ n consistent inference for the common structural parameters.
For general nonlinear models, however, this form of the penalty function will typically not be available in closed form.
The penalty function reduces bias in the resulting extremum estimator from order 1 T to order 1 T 2 asymptotically. We prove this result under asymptotics where n and T go to infinity jointly. We also present a brief Monte Carlo study. The results suggest that the resulting bias corrected estimates will be very useful in settings where T is small, as is the case in many microeconometric applications. Both forms of our penalty function result in bias corrected estimators that perform comparably to other bias corrections proposed in the literature.
The Monte Carlo evidence also suggests that the improvement is most dramatic in nonlinear dynamic models, where the simplicity of our approach is of particular advantage. We consider one such example in an empirical study of insider trading activity, where we estimate an ordered probit model with multiple firm specific parameters. We find fairly robust evidence that insiders base trading decisions on future market returns.
Appendix
The conclusion of Theorem 1 will be valid under the following assumption adapted from Conditions 1-7 in Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) .
Assumption 1 Assume the following hold jointly.
A1. For each
A3. For each i, {x it , t = 1, 2, ...} is a stationary mixing sequence that is independent
m for some a such 0 < a < 1 and some C > 0.
A4. For ψ = (θ, α), the function ϕ(·; ψ) is continuous in (ψ) ∈ Ψ where Ψ is a compact, convex subset of R dim(ψ) .
A5. Let ν = (ν 1 , ..., ν k ) be a vector of nonnegative integers, |ν| = k j=1 ν j , and
for all ψ 1 , ψ 2 ∈ Ψ and |ν| < 5, and M (x it ) satisfies sup ψ∈Ψ D ν ϕ(x it , ψ) ≤ M (x it ) and sup i E |M (x it | 10q+12+δ < ∞ for some integer q ≥ dim(ψ)/2+2 and some δ > 0.
A6. inf i inf T λ iT > 0 where λ iT is the smallest eigenvalue of Var(T
, and let µ il and µ iu be the minimum and maximum eigenvalues of I i . 0 < inf i µ il ≤ sup i µ iu < ∞, and I ≡ lim n→∞ I i exists and is positive definite.
These conditions are equivalent to those used in Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) who provide additional discussion. The restrictions are fairly standard, though A3 does impose stationarity. The initial observations in the simulation study were also generated in such a way that violated the stationarity assumption, so the Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the correction is robust to mild violations of the stationarity assumption.
Given Assumption 1, we sketch an argument for the proof of Theorem 1 below. For simplicity of notation, we consider the case where dim(α i ) = 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Using the form of the penalty function given in (10), the objective function we seek to optimize is given by
With θ fixed, we can solve for α i (θ) = arg max
.., α n ) which satisfies the first order
The score for θ,
, and (16) and defining
it ] and additional subscripts denote partial derivatives, we can write the score for θ as
is the score considered in Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) evaluated at α i (θ) instead of α i (θ) = arg max α i T t=1 ϕ(x it , θ, α i ) and the remaining terms correspond to the bias in the scores. The conclusion then follows by the usual approach of expanding the modified score about θ = θ 0 , solving for θ − θ 0 , and then expanding the first term in the solution which corresponds to the usual score about α i (θ 0 ) = α i0 using (16) to provide the expression for α i (θ 0 ) − α i0 . Under the conditions of Assumption 1 and using similar arguments to Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) , we can then show that
Under Assumption 1 and by construction of the π i , we then have the conclusion. 1,000 replications, N = 250. The DGP is the static logit model: 1,000 replications, N = 250. The DGP is the dynamic ordered probit model:
1 6 c i0 ∼ Beta(3, 6) The regressor x it follows a Gaussian AR(1) process with ρ 0 = .5. Initial conditions are x i0 ∼ N (0, 1) and y * i0 = α i0 + β 0 x i0 + N (0, 1). Distributions of α i0 and c i0 were chosen so that the frequencies of y it correspond approximately with those at the bottom of Ordered probit parameter estimates for our insider trading application. The model is as in equation (15) , for the asymmetric ordered probit model. Parameter estimates for this model are shown in the left columns of Table 5 . Standard errors are given in parentheses. Variables for which neither partial effect is significant at the 10% level are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions are given in Table 3 .
Partial effect 
